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INTERNATIONAL ISSUES IN THE 
REGULATION OF FINANCIAL ADVICE:  
A UNITED KINGDOM PERSPECTIVE—THE 
RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW AND THE 
BAN ON COMMISSION PAYMENTS TO 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 
GERARD MCMEEL† 
Investment products, such as company shares and 
government bonds, have always been an important item of 
wealth, although traditionally limited to a minority or the elite of 
society.1  Life insurance, which often performs an investment 
function, permits many millions to participate indirectly in the 
financial markets, as do pension products.2  However, it is 
commonly said that life insurance is not bought and has to be 
sold.  That may be true of investments more generally, and the 
role of financial intermediaries and salespersons has been critical 
in persuading individuals of the wisdom of contributing to 
pensions, investing in mutual funds, and making other 
investments, as opposed to buying a bigger house or automobile.  
In 2008, Lord Justice Rix in the English Court of Appeal 
observed: 
 
 
† Professor of Commercial Law, University of Manchester, U.K.; Visiting 
Professor of Law, Singapore Management University; Barrister, Guildhall 
Chambers (Bristol) and Quadrant Chambers (London). 
1 See Stuart Banner, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL 
AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 24 (1998) (discussing the rise of a securities 
market in late seventeenth-century England and noting, “As the secondary market 
in government debt and shares of businesses grew, the portion of the nation’s total 
wealth consisting of land and other tangible things gradually declined, replaced 
more and more by mobile pieces of paper, representations of intangible fractions of a 
future stream of income. Within a generation, contemporaries came to realize that 
an entirely new form of property had come into existence.”). 
2 R in re Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd. v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., [2008] 
EWCA (Civ.) 642, [87] (Eng.). 
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It is a feature of our commercial law, robust, pragmatic and 
internationally respected as it may be, that it grew up in an age 
of commerce between merchants, when what we now think of as 
financial consumer contracts must have been relatively few in 
number, limited in their scope, and entered into by a small 
range of professional, mercantile and landowning people.  I 
speak of contracts outside ordinary sale of goods.  Nowadays, 
however, huge numbers of consumers have pensions, make 
investments, and enter into insurance contracts of all kinds.3 
The value added by financial intermediaries and 
salespersons is recognized by the often sizeable commissions paid 
by life insurers and other financial product providers to them 
when a deal is done.  Given that the legal position is that 
independent financial intermediaries are the agents of investors, 
and not the product providers, this has always been difficult to 
reconcile with principles of fiduciary law.  In particular, the 
potential for a conflict of interest is obvious.  One solution is a 
regime of disclosure, although the extent of disclosure necessary 
has been much debated.  The United Kingdom appears to have 
traditionally followed a disclosure model, at least for less 
sophisticated retail customers.4  However, U.K.’s financial 
regulator has resolved that, with effect from December 31, 2012, 
the appropriate solution to the conflict risk is to ban outright all 
payments by product providers to intermediaries.5  This Article 
describes in a little more detail that step and how the U.K. got 
there. 
I. THE U.K. INDUSTRY, REGULATORY CONTEXT, AND 
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BUSINESS 
A. The United Kingdom Financial Services Industry 
The U.K. financial services industry constitutes a significant 
component of its economy.  It is composed of three main sectors: 
banking, insurance, and investment business.  Even in the wake 
of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the contribution of the financial 
 
3 Id. 
4 See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK ¶ 2.3.1 
(2013) [hereinafter CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK].  
5 See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, 2011, Cm. 8083, ¶¶ 1.39.44 (U.K.) [hereinafter 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM]. 
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services industry to the U.K. economy was still significant.6  
Financial services accounted for some eight percent of gross 
domestic product (“GDP”) and they contributed some £38 billion 
net to the U.K.’s balance of payments.7  Over one million people 
are employed in the financial services industry in the U.K., a 
third of them in London, but the remainder spread out across the 
U.K., overall some five percent of the workforce.8  Over 24,500 
separate firms constitute the regulated financial services 
industry.9 
B. Financial Crises and Legislative Reaction 
The U.K. experience of greater participation in modern 
financial products has been far from a uniformly positive one.  
Between 1988 and 1994, it was estimated that between one 
million and two million ordinary investors were sold the wrong 
type of pension.10  They were persuaded to opt out of, or not join, 
occupational pension schemes, with deﬁned beneﬁts, and instead 
take out an investment product-based pension usually offered by 
life insurance companies.  The latter involved greater exposure to 
market risk and fewer beneﬁts than the occupational schemes.  
Such investors faced a potentially signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss.  The 
scale of the pension mis-selling scandal and its ﬁnancial extent 
were unprecedented.11  The final estimated bill for compensation 
exceeded £12 billion.12  What were the causes of mis-selling?  
 
6 HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2009, Cm. 7667, ¶ 1.6 
[hereinafter REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS]. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. ¶¶ 1.6, 1.9. Compare these figures to the European Union average of 2.5% 
of employment in the financial services sector. Commission of the European 
Communities, Report from the Commission: Progress on Financial Services, at 3, 
COM (2000) 336 final (May 30, 2000).  
9 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: APPROACH TO 
REGULATION ¶ 1.10 (2011) [hereinafter APPROACH TO REGULATION]. 
10 See SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY, THE MIS-SELLING OF PERSONAL 
PENSIONS, 1998, ¶¶ 1–2 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/ 
pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmtreasy/712/71203.htm. 
11 For detailed discussion of the saga, see generally Gerard McMeel, The 
Consumer Dimension of Financial Services Law: Lessons from the Pension Mis-
selling Scandal, 1 COMPANY, FIN., & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 29 (1997); Julia Black & 
Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and Lessons of Regulatory 
Failure, 61 M.L.R. 789 (1998); Gerard McMeel, Liability of Financial Advisers in the 
Wake of the Pension Mis-selling Scandal, 13 PROF. NEGL. 97 (1997). 
12 Rupert Jones, Mis-selling Bill Tops £13bn, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2000), 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2000/dec/02/personalfinancenews.business. 
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Payment to salespersons by commission was a cause emphasised 
by many commentators.  In the House of Lords in Lloyds TSB 
General Insurance Holdings v. Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co. 
Ltd.,13 Lord Hoffmann accepted this was one of the key factors, 
although putting payment by commission into perspective:  “The 
underlying reasons for mis-selling were partly the method by 
which salesmen were paid but largely the inadequacy of the 
training and monitoring of their peformance provided by the 
companies employing them.”14 
The pension mis-selling scandal was one of the principal 
reasons cited for the financial regulatory reforms undertaken by 
the Labour Government elected in May 1997.  Similar mis-selling 
problems were experienced with home income plans or equity 
release mortgages marketed to elderly investors.  In addition, 
there was widespread endowment policy mis-selling in the retail 
mortgage sector.  The total cost of redress for the industry was £3 
billion.15  In 2000, in the wake of Equitable Life’s near-collapse, 
“with profits” life insurance products fell under a cloud, and the 
issue of compensation for policyholders had rumbled on for more 
than a decade.  The payment protection insurance (“PPI”) mis-
selling scandal, which embraced banks, credit card companies, 
and other credit providers, resulted in £5.9 billion being paid out 
in compensation between January 2011 and July 2012, with the 
final bill yet to be ascertained.16  The Financial Services 
Authority (“FSA”) estimated that the total bill for compensating 
consumers for all of these financial scandals was some £15 
billion, with the bulk of PPI compensation yet to come.17  Lord 
Turner, the Chairman of the FSA, writing in January 2011, 
accepted that the regulator’s sales-focused philosophy “has not 
been effective in preventing waves of . . . consumer detriment.”18  
 
13 Lloyds TSB Gen. Ins. Holdings v. Lloyds Bank Grp. Ins. Co. Ltd., [2003] 
UKHL 48 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales). 
14 Id. ¶ 5. 
15 OLIVER WYMAN, MIS-SELLING IN THE UK 7 (2011), available at 
https://web.actuaries.ie/sites/default/files/event/2011/07/111020%20ERM%20Forum
%20-%20Daniel%20Mikkelsen.pdf. 
16 The FSA published a monthly update on PPI refunds and compensation 
payments to date. Monthly PPI Refunds and Compensation, FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/consumerinformation/product_news/insurance/payment_prote
ction_insurance_/latest/monthly-ppi-payouts (last updated Aug. 8, 2013).  
17 APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 9, ¶ 1.1. 
18 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCUSSION PAPER 11/1: PRODUCT INTERVENTION 3 
(2011); see also id. ¶¶ 2.3.4, 5.14; Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), 
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Since then, further concerns have arisen from what the FSA has 
determined are serious failings in the sale of interest rate 
hedging products by banks to small and medium-sized 
businesses, with banks undertaking to review sales and provide 
redress where appropriate.19  In July 2012, the London Inter-
Bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) fixing scandal broke.  LIBOR is 
used both for setting commercial lending rates and in 
determining some U.K. residential mortgage interest rates.  
Martin Wheatley, the Managing Director of the FSA and Chief 
Executive Officer-designate of the new Financial Conduct 
Authority, has been appointed by George Osborne, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to conduct a review of the 
benchmark rate and how it should be reformed or replaced.20 
The “freezing” of wholesale money markets in September 
2007 saw the first “run” on a U.K. bank, Northern Rock, since the 
Overend and Gurney collapse in the nineteenth century.  The 
stricken former building society, similar to a Savings & Loan, 
was eventually fully nationalized in February 2008.21  More was 
to follow later in the year in the wake of the “credit crunch,” with 
the near-collapse of the U.K. banking industry averted by 
massive capital injections and corporate acquisitions and 
restructuring.  By January 2009, the Chairman of the FSA, Lord 
Turner, observed ruefully:  “[T]he world financial system—and 
particularly but not exclusively the world banking system—has 
suffered a crisis as bad as any since the stock market crashes of 
1929 and the various banking crises that followed.”22  In 
December 2011, the FSA published its report on the near-
 
Speech at the British Bankers’ Association Conference: Protecting Consumers and 
Winning Trust (July 13, 2010). 
19 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTEREST RATE HEDGING PRODUCTS: INFORMATION 
ABOUT OUR WORK AND FINDINGS 1 (2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/ 
pubs/other/interest-rate-hedging-products.pdf. 
20 HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: INITIAL DISCUSSION 
PAPER ¶ 1.1 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ 
uploads/attachment_data/file/191763/condoc_wheatley_review.pdf; see also Martin 
Wheatley, Managing Dir., Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at Bloomberg: Wheatley 
Review—The Future of LIBOR (Aug. 10, 2012). 
21 See generally Northern Rock plc Transfer Order, 2008, S.I. 2008/432 (U.K.). 
The Temporary Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 has now been replaced by 
permanent legislation in the shape of the Banking Act 2009, which has already been 
used to rescue the Dunfermline Building Society. See Banking Act 2009, c. 1 (U.K.). 
22 Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at The Economist’s 
Inaugural City Lecture: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation 
(Jan. 21, 2009). 
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collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland in October 2008.  This 
followed its disastrous takeover of ABN-Amro.  The bailout 
required a £45.5 billion equity capital injection from taxpayers’ 
funds—a stake now only worth about £20 billion.  The report 
exposed the multiple failings both at the bank and at the 
regulator. 
C. From Multiple Functional Regulators to “Single Regulator” 
The regulatory framework for U.K. financial services, which 
had developed over the course of the twentieth century, was 
complex and fragmented.  There were multiple regulators, often 
more than one for each of the three sectors of the industry.  The 
governing legislation and regulatory requirements were 
embodied in multifarious statutes, delegated legislative 
instruments, codes, and rulebooks.  In addition, there existed 
various redress mechanisms and safety-net compensation 
schemes.  The resulting picture was confusing for practitioners, 
let alone ordinary consumers.  The Labour administration elected 
in May 1997 undertook a fundamental overhaul of the financial 
regulatory structure in the U.K. and decisively embraced what 
was portrayed as a single regulator model in the shape of the 
FSA.  The Bank of England, the U.K.’s Central Bank, was 
stripped of its role as banking regulator by the Bank of England 
Act 1998, and the new regulator’s powers were formalized under 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”).  
However the financial crisis of 2007–2008 raised questions about 
the role of the supposed “single regulator,” its relationship with 
the Bank of England and the Treasury, the U.K.’s finance 
ministry—collectively, the so-called “tri-partite authorities.”  
Further legislation followed in the wake of the financial crisis, 
including the temporary Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, 
the Banking Act 2009, which superseded the 2008 Act, and the 
Financial Services Act 2010. 
Over a dozen years after the FSA was initially launched in 
1997, and despite the lengthy legislative reform process 
culminating in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, 
financial regulatory reform remains high on the agenda.  In July 
2009, both the then U.K. Labour Government and the 
Conservative Party, then Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, issued 
blueprints for the future.  The Labour Government’s 2009 White 
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Paper23 was predictably focused on measures in respect of the 
banking sector and improved prudential and supervisory 
arrangements in the wake of the banking and financial crisis of 
20072008.24  It was clear that the Labour Government 
continued to regard the system which it had implemented in its 
first term—with the FSA as the principal regulator and a 
correspondingly reduced role for the Bank of England—as the 
appropriate one.  The principal proposals in the 2009 White 
Paper were for a new Council for Financial Stability to facilitate 
cooperation between the Treasury, Bank of England, and 
Financial Services Authority, together with a new, explicit 
statutory objective for the Financial Services Authority of 
maintaining financial stability.25  The Brown administration also 
accepted Lord Turner’s conclusion that the Financial Services 
Authority had placed too much emphasis on conducting business 
regulation at the expense of prudential supervision of the crucial 
banking sector.26  However, the proposed technical law reforms 
were limited.  These proposals were to a large extent 
implemented in the Financial Services Act 2010, which received 
the Royal Assent before the May 2010 General Election. 
D. The Proposals of the Coalition Government 
Whilst in opposition, the Conservative Party, led by David 
Cameron, published its own rival and more wide-ranging 
proposals on financial regulatory reform (the “Opposition White 
Paper”).27  It boldly proposed the abolition of the Financial 
Services Authority, the return of prudential regulation of 
significant firms by the Bank of England, and a new Consumer 
Protection Agency, which, it appears, would embrace the 
Financial Services Authority’s conduct of business remit, 
together with the consumer credit responsibilities of the Office of 
 
23 REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 6, at 6.  
24 Id. ¶ 2.1. 
25 Id. ¶ 4.29. 
26 Id. ¶ 4.58. This point is also emphasized by the Conservatives. See U.K. 
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR SOUND BANKING 15 
(2009), available at http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2009/07/~/ 
media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/PlanforSoundBanking.ashx. 
27 See U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 26, at 15. 
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Fair Trading.28  Essentially this appears to come close to 
embracing what is sometimes called the “twin peaks” approach to 
financial regulation, with separate regulators focusing on 
prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation 
respectively. 
The formation of a Coalition Government—the first since 
World War II—of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in May 
2010, following the General Election, led to promises of further 
significant financial regulatory reform.  The agreement which 
forms the basis of the Coalition Government stated that the 
financial regulatory system would be reformed to avoid a repeat 
of the financial crisis and that the Bank of England would be 
given control of macro-prudential regulation and oversight of 
micro-prudential regulation.29  In his first Mansion House speech 
on June 16, 2010, new Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne, confirmed that the Coalition Government did not 
believe that the current system of financial regulation was 
working.30  He outlined a so-called “twin peaks” strategy—albeit 
he did not use that language—for separating prudential 
supervision from conduct of business regulation.  The Financial 
Services Authority would cease to exist in its current form. Mr 
Osborne observed:  “The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost 
entirely focused on rules based regulation.”31  A new Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (“PRA”) would operate as a subsidiary of 
the Bank of England, which would oversee macro-prudential 
policy.  A new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority 
would be responsible for conduct of business regulation for both 
retail and wholesale firms. 
 
 
 
28 Under the proposals, the FSA would retain responsibility for both prudential 
and conduct of business regulation of 17,000 smaller firms, which are of limited 
concern to overall financial stability. Id. at 47. 
29 HM GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 9 
(2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach 
ment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_government.pdf. 
30 Tola Onanuga, Emergency Budget: George Osborne’s Speech in Full, 
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/22/ 
emergency-budget-full-speech-text. 
31 George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s 
Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London: Check Against Delivery 
(June 16, 2010). 
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In July 2010, the Treasury published more detailed 
proposals in A New Approach to Financial Regulation: 
Judgement, Focus and Stability (the “Coalition White Paper”).32  
The “tripartite system” whereby the Bank of England, the 
Treasury, and the FSA were all collectively and notionally 
responsible for financial stability was in part blamed for failings 
in the U.K. regulatory framework exposed by the financial crisis.  
It confirmed the proposed separation of responsibility for 
prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation.  A 
new Prudential Regulation Authority would have operational 
responsibility for prudential regulation and would be a 
subsidiary of the Bank of England, which would be responsible 
for macro-prudential policy through a new Financial Policy 
Committee (“FPC”) and would have oversight of micro-prudential 
policy.33  A new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority 
(“CPMA”) would be responsible for conduct of business regulation 
for both retail and wholesale firms.  In the view of the Treasury,  
“Prudential and conduct of business regulation require different 
approaches and cultures.”34 
Chapter Four of the Coalition White Paper provided more 
detail on the proposed CPMA.35  It was acknowledged that CPMA 
is a working title,36 and in February 2011, the Coalition 
Government announced that it had finalized the name for this 
body as the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).37  Given that 
the CPMA and FCA will be the same corporate entity as the FSA 
for cost reasons, as a matter of substance, the FCA appears to be 
essentially the FSA, albeit stripped of responsibility for 
prudential regulation.38  The Coalition White Paper moots  
 
 
 
32 See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: 
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, 2010, Cm. 7874 (U.K.) [hereinafter JUDGEMENT, 
FOCUS AND STABILITY]; see also HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL 
REGULATION: A SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION RESPONSES, 2010 (U.K.); HM 
TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: BUILDING A STRONGER 
SYSTEM, 2011, Cm. 8012 (U.K.) [hereinafter BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM]. 
33 See JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, at 9–30 (highlighting 
the detailed proposals). 
34 Id. ¶¶ 1.20, 4.2; see also BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5, ¶ 1.6. 
35 JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, at 31–39. 
36 Id. ¶ 4.3. 
37 BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, supra note 32, ¶ 1.10. 
38 JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, ¶ 4.30. 
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developing and enhancing the FSA’s own initiative variation of 
permission powers as a key regulatory tool of the FCA.39  In 
terms of regulatory philosophy some continuity is stressed: 
[T]he CPMA will build on the progress recently made by the 
FSA towards a more interventionist and pre-emptive approach 
to retail conduct regulation.  As a starting point, it will adopt 
the FSA’s new Retail Conduct of Business Strategy, and it will 
continue with initiatives such as the Retail Distribution Review, 
Mortgage Market Review, and work on responsible lending.  
These initiatives recognise and respond to some of the 
distinctive characteristics of retail financial services that call for 
a more intrusive approach, such as long-term product payoffs, 
product complexity and asymmetry of information between 
consumers and producers.  This will necessarily be backed by a 
strong approach to enforcement to ensure credible deterrence.40 
Similarly, continuity is maintained in respect of complaints 
and compensation in that the proposals envisage the same roles 
for the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) and the Financial 
Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”) in the regulatory 
picture.41 
E. The Financial Services Act 2012 
In June 2011, the Treasury published a further consultation 
paper and White Paper attaching a draft Financial Services 
Bill,42 or more precisely only the “core provisions needed to give 
effect to the reform proposals,” with “many technical and 
consequential provisions” not yet drafted.43  Critically, the 2011 
White Paper evidenced the Coalition Government’s decision not 
to wipe the slate clean and start again, but rather it intended to 
amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.44  The 
proposed core amending draft legislation was put forward for pre-
legislative scrutiny.  The centerpiece of the new financial services 
regime45 is the new Financial Policy Committee (“FPC”), a 
committee of the Court of the Bank of England, with overall 
responsibility for the financial system and for macro-prudential 
 
39 Id. ¶ 4.24. 
40 Id.  
41 Id. ¶ 4.43. 
42 BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5. 
43 Id. ¶ 1.17. 
44 Id. ¶ 1.18. 
45 Id. at 8 fig.1.A. 
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policy in particular, “sitting at the apex of the regulatory 
architecture.”46  It will be chaired by the Governor of the Bank of 
England, and the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct 
Authority will be amongst the members.47  Underneath the FPC, 
the new PRA would be a subsidiary of the Bank of England, with 
operational responsibility for prudential regulation of larger 
firms whose balance sheets make them relevant to the financial 
system and its stability as a whole, namely the banks, insurers, 
and larger investment firms.48  Lastly, the new FCA will 
specialize in conduct of business regulation and promotion of 
confidence in financial markets, services, and products.49  Its 
proposed new powers embrace the following: “product 
intervention” powers, which would permit the FCA to impose 
requirements on financial products or even to ban them; an 
ability to disclose the commencement of enforcement action; and 
improvements to the powers to deal with misleading financial 
promotions.50  Broadly speaking, the roles of the FSCS and the 
FOS are being retained.51 
Between July and December 2011, the draft Financial 
Services Bill underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by a “Joint 
Committee for the draft Financial Services Bill.”52  Following this 
scrutiny, the Treasury published a further consultation 
document53 outlining further changes to the draft Bill, including 
major changes to the crisis management arrangements between 
the Treasury and Bank of England.54  Furthermore, the revised 
Bill reflected the decision to transfer consumer credit regulation 
to the FCA.  The Financial Services Bill was introduced into 
Parliament on January 26, 2012, which included significant 
changes from the draft Bill to the FCA’s statutory objectives and 
its statutory principles of good regulation.  The Bill also 
transfered full responsibility for regulation of consumer credit 
under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to the FCA.  The Financial 
 
46 Id. ¶ 1.29. 
47 Id. ¶¶ 1.25–.30. 
48 Id. ¶¶ 1.31–.38. 
49 Id. ¶¶ 1.39–.44. 
50 Id. ¶ 1.43; see also APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 9, ¶ 4.1. 
51 BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.196–.204. 
52 HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: SECURING 
STABILITY, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, 2012, Cm. 8268, ¶ 1.3 (U.K.). 
53 Id. ¶ 1.4. 
54 Id. ¶¶ 1.5–.12. 
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Services Act 2012 received the Royal Assent in December 2012 
and therefore passed into law.  The Coalition’s aim is for the 
latest version of the U.K. financial regulatory system to be 
operational during the course of 2013. 
F. The Regulation of Investment Business 
Probably as a result of the numerous scandals, stability of 
the regulatory environment for U.K. investment business has not 
been a feature of the landscape.  Prior to the reforms associated 
with the so-called “Big Bang” deregulation of the City of London 
in the second half of the 1980s, there was a rudimentary regime 
represented by the unambitiously-named Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Acts 1939 and 1958.  Since the implementation of 
the Financial Services Act 1986 (the “1986 Act”) there have been 
several major phases of regulatory rules in respect of investor 
protection in the retail financial sector.  First, under the 1986 
Act, from its implementation on April 29, 1988 to May 1, 1994, 
there was the initial regime comprising the regulatory rules of 
various Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”), consciously 
modeled on the American approach.  These SROs included, for 
the retail sector, the short-lived duo, the Life Assurance and Unit 
Trust Regulatory Organisation (“LAUTRO”)—broadly speaking, 
the product providers—and the Financial Intermediaries, 
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (“FIMBRA”)—
representing the client-facing advisers and brokers.  Secondly, 
under the same legislation, from 1994 to 2001, an amalgamated 
SRO, the Personal Investment Authority (“PIA”) superseded 
LAUTRO and FIMBRA but to a large extent adopted its 
predecessors’ provisions in its own rulebook.  Now product 
providers and intermediaries were regulated by the same front-
line regulator.  Thirdly, under the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 from December 1, 2001 (“N2”) to October 2007, 
the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (“COB”)55 component of the 
Financial Services Authority’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance 
consolidated and superseded its various predecessor regulators’ 
rulebooks for the conduct of investment business.56  After N2 
COB was further amended on a number of fronts, including the 
 
55 See G. MCMEEL & J. VIRGO, FINANCIAL ADVICE AND FINANCIAL PRODUCTS: 
LAW AND LIABILITY ch 14 (2001). (discussing the original version of COB). 
56 Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (U.K.). 
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depolarization initiative, which permitted intermediaries to be 
multi-tied to a defined number of product providers, whereas 
previously since the introduction of SRO regimes they had to be 
either tied to one provider or wholly independent.  In mid-2005, 
the FSA proposed fundamental changes to COB.57  The main 
impetus came from the need to implement new European law—
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)—with 
effect from November 1, 2007 and resulting in the new Conduct 
of Business Sourcebook (“COBS”) component of the Handbook.58  
Lastly, December 31, 2012 saw the implementation of the Retail 
Distribution Review (“RDR”), which is this Article’s focus and 
which bans payment of commission to intermediaries.  
Accordingly, in twenty-five years, from the beginning of 1988 to 
the end of 2012, there have been some six significant regulatory 
phases for investment firms. 
G. The Regulatory Regime Under FSMA 
In the FSA’s Handbook of rules and guidance, made under 
FSMA, the following propositions are relevant.  First, the FSA 
Principles for Businesses—PRIN 2.1.1R—Principle 6 states:  “A 
firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and 
treat them fairly.”59  Secondly, FSA Principle 8 states:  “A firm 
must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and 
its customers and between a customer and another client.”60  It 
should be noted that while these Principles are FSA rules, they 
are, exceptionally, not actionable by private persons under FSMA 
section 150.61  The most relevant component to investment 
business, including life insurance business, is COBS. 
 
 
 
57 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 05/10, REVIEWING THE FSA 
HANDBOOK: MONEY LAUNDERING, APPROVED PERSONS, TRAINING AND COMPETENCE, 
AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 1–9, 37–45, Annex 5 (2005). 
58 See Directive 2006/31, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 114) (EC) (extending the time limit 
for the implementation of MiFID). 
59 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESSES ¶ 2.1.1 (2013). 
60 Id. 
61 See id. ¶ 3.4.4. 
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H. The FSA Handbook Pre-RDR 
At a general level, COBS 2.1.1R, which implements article 
19(1) of MiFID, provided:  “(1) A firm must act honestly, fairly 
and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
client (the client’s best interests rule).”62 
More specifically, COBS 2.3.1R, which implements article 
26(1) of the MiFID Implementing Directive, provided: 
A firm must not pay or accept any fee or commission, or provide 
or receive any non-monetary benefit, in relation to designated 
investment business . . . other than: 
(1) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided 
to or by the client or a person on behalf of the client; or 
(2) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided 
to or by a third party or a person acting on behalf of a third 
party, if: 
(a) the payment of the fee or commission, or the provision of the 
non-monetary benefit does not impair compliance with the 
firm’s duty to act in the best interests of the client; and 
(b) the existence, nature and amount of the fee, commission or 
benefit, or, where the amount cannot be ascertained, the 
method of calculating that amount, is clearly disclosed to the 
client, in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and 
understandable, before the provision of the service . . . or 
(3) proper fees which enable or are necessary for the provision of 
designated investment business or ancillary services, such as 
custody costs, settlement and exchange fees, regulatory levies or 
legal fees, and which, by their nature, cannot give rise to 
conflicts with the firm’s duties to act honestly, fairly and 
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its 
clients.63 
COBS 2.3 contained a more stringent regime on inducements 
and indirect benefits than any previous regulatory regime.  Prior 
to 2007, the regulators were generally content to say that firms 
should consider the implications of general fiduciary law.  In 
contrast, COBS 2.3 required full disclosure of third-party 
commission payments.  It is also provided that any fee, 
commission, or non-monetary benefit paid or provided to or by a 
third party “must be designed to enhance the quality of the 
 
62 Id. ¶ 2.1.1. 
63 Id. ¶ 2.3.1. 
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relevant service to the client.”64  In accordance with guidance 
from the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”), 
a firm was able to comply with its obligations on inducements so 
long as it disclosed the essential arrangements relating to any 
fee, commission, or non-monetary benefit in summary form, and 
undertook to give further disclosure on request, and honored that 
undertaking.  The regime was also extended by the FSA to 
packaged investment products which fall outside the scope of 
MiFID. 
Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls 
(“SYSC”), in chapter ten of the FSA handbook, includes material 
on conflicts of interest, which in a previous incarnation formed 
part of the old COB.  SYSC 10.1.3R, which implements article 
18(1) of MiFID, provided: 
A firm must take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of 
interest between: 
(1) the firm, including its managers, employees and appointed 
representatives (or where applicable, tied agents), or any person 
directly or indirectly linked to them by control, and a client of 
the firm; or 
(2) one client of the firm and another client; that arise or may 
arise in the course of the firm providing any service referred to 
in SYSC 10.1.1 R.65 
Furthermore, SYSC 10.1.4R, which implements article 21(1) of 
MiFID Implementing Directive stated: 
For the purposes of identifying the types of conflict of interest 
that arise, or may arise, in the course of providing a service and 
whose existence may entail a material risk of damage to the 
interests of a client, a common platform firm and a management 
company must take into account, as a minimum, whether the 
firm or a relevant person, or a person directly or indirectly 
linked by control to the firm: 
(1) is likely to make a financial gain, or avoid a financial loss, at 
the expense of the client; 
 
64 THE COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATIONS, INDUCEMENTS UNDER MIFID: 
RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ 13 (2007) (based on MiFID Implementing Directive, 
Commission Directive, 2006/73, art 26(b)(ii), 2006 O.J. (L.241) 26 (EC), fleshing out 
MiFID, Directive 2004/39, art 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC)). 
65 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS AND 
CONTROLS ¶ 10.1.3 (2013). 
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(2) has an interest in the outcome of a service provided to the 
client or of a transaction carried out on behalf of the client, 
which is distinct from the client’s interest in that outcome.66 
II. THE RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW 
A. The RDR Discussion Paper 
In June 2007, the principal Discussion Paper on the RDR 
was published67 and it was originally intended to provide full 
feedback in October 2008.  However, in August 2008,68 at the 
height of the financial crisis, the FSA announced that it would be 
November 2008 before any full feedback statement would be 
published, principally in the wake of the appointment of Jon Pain 
as Managing Director of Retail Markets at the FSA.  The original 
Discussion Paper attracted some 888 responses and obviously 
prompted some significant further thinking at the FSA, as 
evidenced by an Interim Report.69 
The original Discussion Paper pointed out that, although the 
retail investment sector had been regulated for two decades, 
numerous features of the industry—complex charging structures, 
heavy reliance on commission-based advisers, poor quality advice 
going undetected for many years, and limited training of 
advisers—suggested an inefficient market.  It favored, effectively, 
a class-based system of “professional financial planning” for high-
income consumers and more basic “primary advice” for the rest.70  
The latter regime might include a watering-down of the 
suitability regime.71  It was not difficult to foresee that both 
European standards required by MiFID and other Directives, not 
to say the common law standard of care, might pose obstacles for 
this project.72 
 
66 Id. ¶ 10.1.4. 
67 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCUSSION PAPER 07/1: A REVIEW OF RETAIL 
DISTRIBUTION (2007) [hereinafter REVIEW OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION]. 
68 Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), FSA Announces Change to RDR 
Timetable (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/ 
pr/2008/088.shtml. 
69 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW—INTERIM REPORT ¶ 24 
(2008) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT]. 
70 REVIEW OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION, supra note 67, ¶ 20. 
71 Id. ¶ 22. 
72 Id. ¶¶ 5.32–.35. 
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B. RDR Interim Report 
In April 2008, in the Interim Report,73 perhaps driven by the 
relatively large consultative response—presumably industry-
led—the FSA conceded that there was a consensus among 
respondents that its original proposals were too complex.  And it 
appeared sympathetic to consultees’ calls for a “simpler 
landscape” with a clear distinction between “advice” and “sales.”74  
It now favored only one species of adviser, coupled with a “step-
change in the standards required of advisers.”75  All would be 
independent, whole of market advisers whose remuneration was 
set without product provider input.  Professional or educational 
standards would be increased.  In contrast, “sales” would be 
strictly non-advised, in the form of either execution-only or 
guided sales in the context of wider government initiatives to 
promote more saving and investment.  Again it was easy to 
foresee significant obstacles ahead of this anticipated terrain, 
from both European and domestic legal constraints.  
Furthermore, the long-standing lack of clarity in the consumer 
financial services context between giving advice and providing 
information does not look capable of swift resolution,76 and the 
widespread incidence of supposedly “execution-only” transactions 
in the earlier pensions and endowment mis-sales episodes should 
not be forgotten.  In addition, in this Interim Report, as a first 
step, the FSA exhorts product providers to drop out of their 
traditional role of remunerating advisers, and regulated firms 
generally are prodded in the direction of common professional 
standards. 
C. The FSA Feedback: The Death Knell for Commission-Driven 
Sales 
In November 2008, the FSA eventually provided its feedback 
and mapped out the future, in which the RDR spawned the 
“Retail Distribution Implementation Programme” (“RDIP”), 
rolling forward to the end of 2012.77  A clearer distinction will be 
 
73 INTERIM REPORT, supra note 69. 
74 Id. ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. ¶ 4.9. 
77 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FEEDBACK STATEMENT 08/6, RETAIL DISTRIBUTION 
REVIEW—INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON DP07/1 AND THE INTERIM REPORT ¶ 17 (2008). 
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drawn between “independent advice” and “sales advice.”78  
However, any attempt to draw a clear distinction between sales 
and advice has been dropped following discussions with the 
European Commission that confirmed that the proposed simpler 
landscape proposal would be inconsistent with MiFID.79  
Crucially, product providers were to be removed from a role in 
intermediary remuneration.  This was the death knell of 
commission-driven (mis)sales.  In the words of Jon Pain:  “This is 
the end of the potential for commission bias.”80  Dan Waters, the 
FSA’s Director of Retail Policy and Conduct Risk, was even more 
emphatic:  “[T]hese rules will bring to an end the current practice 
in the UK of product providers offering adviser firms amounts of 
commission for selling their products.”81 
D. Implementing the RDR 
At the end of June 2009, the FSA published its consultation 
paper on delivering the RDR, including draft Handbook text.82  
Despite the proclaimed commitment to greater clarity in the way 
in which firms describe their services to consumers, the FSA 
itself—having flirted with suggested distinctions between 
“professional financial planning” and “primary advice,” “advice” 
and “sales,” and “independent advice” and “sales advice”—
eventually settled upon “independent advice” and “restricted 
advice.”83  Long-standing observers of the retail investment 
industry may detect a hint of “repolarization” after “polarization” 
and “depolarization.”  Crucially, all investment advice firms must 
set their own charges, with product providers being banned from 
offering commission to secure sales.84  The intended scope of the 
new regime embraces not just the traditional “packaged 
products” but also unregulated collective investment schemes, all 
 
78 Id. ¶ 3.9. 
79 Id. ¶ 13. 
80 Jon Pain, Managing Dir. of Retail Mkts., Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at 
the FSA Distribution Review Seminar, Edinburgh: The Retail Distribution Review—
The Key to Our Retail Strategy (Jan. 15, 2009). 
81 Dan Waters, Dir. of Retail Policy & Conduct Risk, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), 
Speech at ABI Conference: The Retail Distribution Review—Practical Challenges for 
the Investment Industry (Jan. 16, 2009). 
82 FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 09/18, DISTRIBUTION OF RETAIL 
INVESTMENTS: DELIVERING THE RDR (2009). 
83 Id. at chs. 23. 
84 Id. at ch. 4. 
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holdings in investment trusts, and structured investment 
products.85  Consideration is also being given to rolling out the 
same approach for general insurance and mortgage products.86 
E. COBS After the RDR 
The principal new rules are found in COBS 6.1A for all firms 
providing advice to retail clients, that is, intermediaries.  In 
particular, COBS 6.1A.4R provides: 
[A] firm must: 
(1) only be remunerated for the personal recommendation (and 
any other related services provided by the firm) by adviser 
charges; and 
(2) not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates 
solicits or accepts) any other commissions, remuneration or 
benefit of any kind in relation to the personal recommendation 
or any other related service, regardless of whether it intends to 
refund the payments or pass the benefits on to the retail client; 
and 
(3) not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates 
solicits or accepts) adviser charges in relation to the retail 
client’s retail investment product which are paid out or advanced 
by another party over a materially different time period, or on a 
materially different basis, from that in or on which the adviser 
charges are recovered from the retail client.87 
COBS 6.1B.5R then bans providers and platforms from 
making such payments: 
[A] firm must not offer or pay (and must ensure that none of its 
associates offers or pays) any commissions, remuneration or 
benefit of any kind to another firm, or to any other third party 
for the benefit of that firm, in relation to a personal 
recommendation (or any related services), except those that 
facilitate the payment of adviser charges from a retail client’s 
investments in accordance with this section.88 
Lastly, from December 31, 2012, COBS 2.3.1R(2)(c) extended 
to general insurance business, meaning non-life business, a rule 
that a payment to or benefits conferred upon an intermediary by 
an insurer must “enhance the quality of the service provided to 
 
85 Id. ¶ 1.5. 
86 Id. ¶ 1.7 & ch. 6. 
87 CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 6.1.A.4. 
88 Id. ¶ 6.1.B.5. 
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the client,” in addition to the existing “best interests” rule.89  New 
guidance at COBS 2.3.16A G suggests that an agreement may 
break rules if it provides a key source of income for a distributor. 
F. The Regulator Flexes Its Muscles 
In the run-up to implementation of the RDR, on October 1, 
2012, a senior regulator from the FSA—the Head of the Life 
Insurance Department, Conduct Business Unit—wrote to the 
CEOs of the largest providers of retail investment products and 
largest distributors.  These providers included life insurers, large 
independent financial intermediary firms, and networks of 
independent financial advisers.  The letter announced:  “We are 
concerned that some firms may be looking for ways to circumvent 
the adviser charging rules by soliciting or providing payments 
that do not look like traditional commission, but are generally 
intended to achieve the same outcome.”90  It lamented that such 
arrangements were “not in the spirit of the RDR.”91  Such 
arrangements are to be found in the intermediary contracts or 
“distribution agreements” between provider firms and distributor 
firms—that is, client-facing advisory firms.92  The FSA renewed 
its threat to supervise heavily in an attempt to detect attempted 
circumventions of the new regime.  The FSA formally sought 
confirmation that all distribution agreements of the targeted 
firms complied with the existing COBS 2.3 and the incoming new 
rules, COBS 6.1A, for all firms providing advice to retail clients, 
and COBS 6.1B, for providers and platforms, together with other, 
unpublished information. 
The FSA instanced three examples of inducements which 
caused it concern: first, contributions by provider firms to the 
costs of a distributor firm’s training or conference events, 
including lavish social benefits unrelated to training—no more 
cakes and ale; second, payments by a provider to a distributor for 
“assistance” with promoting the provider’s products—these 
payments had to reflect the actual costs incurred by the 
 
89 Id. ¶ 2.3.1(2)(c). 
90 Letter from Nick Poyntz-Wright, Head of Life Insurance Department, 
Conduct Business Unit, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), to the CEOs of a Sample of Life 
Insurers and Networks/IFAs (Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/ 
pubs/guidance/rdr-inducements-rules.pdf.  
91 Id. 
92 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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distributor firm in promoting the services; third, payments to a 
distributor to update IT hardware and software.  The FSA had 
had sight of five-year agreements providing IT support with 
sizeable payments being made in advance of December 31, 2012.  
These practices could offend the existing regime by encouraging a 
breach of the “best interests” rule, especially where the payments 
constitute a significant source of income for the distributor and 
might involve a breach of the rules requiring disclosure to clients 
of permitted inducements.93  In addition, such practices could 
breach the new regime under COBS 6.1A, for all firms providing 
advice to retail clients, and COBS 6.1B, for providers and 
platforms.  Large up-front payments on the eve of the RDR might 
be apportioned across the length of the distribution contract. 
III. U.K. FIDUCIARY LAW 
A. Who Is a Fiduciary Under English Law? 
The law governing fiduciaries under English law pre-dates 
and co-exists with the regulatory law described above.  Much of 
the remuneration of financial intermediaries, who were 
notionally the agents of the investor and therefore owed them 
fiduciary duties, was difficult to reconcile with equitable 
principles.  The core requirement for the recognition of a 
fiduciary obligation is an assumption of responsibility for the 
property or affairs of another.  The paradigm of the disinterested 
management of the affairs of another is the prime example of 
fiduciary responsibility, the trustee.94  In addition, the agent 
constituted another status-based example of the fiduciary 
regime.95  In the leading modern English authority of Bristol & 
West Building Society v. Mothew,96 Lord Justice Millett stated:  
It is obvious that not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a 
breach of fiduciary duty . . . [b]reach of fiduciary obligation, 
therefore, connotes disloyalty or infidelity.  Mere incompetence  
 
 
 
 
93 CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 2.3.9. 
94 The seminal case is Keech v. Sandford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223. 
95 Logicrose Ltd. v. Southend United Football Club Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256 
(Eng.). 
96 [1998] Ch. 1 (Eng.). 
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is not enough.  A servant who loyally does his incompetent best 
for his master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of a breach of 
fiduciary duty.97   
It is only the second type of duty, that of loyalty, which is the 
true fiduciary obligation.  As Lord Justice Millett observed in 
Bristol & West Building Society:98   
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on 
behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which 
give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence.  The 
distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of 
loyalty.  The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of 
his fiduciary.99   
If the core obligation of the fiduciary is loyalty, a paradigm of 
breach of fiduciary duty is non-disclosure.  The relationship 
between a fiduciary and his or her principal is one of the two 
main exceptions in English law to the rule that, in contractual 
transactions, there is no general duty to disclose material facts.  
As a general rule, if the fiduciary makes full disclosure of all the 
circumstances surrounding a transaction to the principal and the 
principal gives informed consent to the dealings by the fiduciary, 
a transaction will stand. 
B. The Obligations of the Fiduciary 
The obligations of the fiduciary stemming from the core 
principle of loyalty are multi-faceted, as recognized by Lord 
Justice Millett in Bristol & West Building Society:100 
This core liability has several facets.  A fiduciary must act in 
good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must 
not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest 
may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of 
a third person without the informed consent of his principal.  
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient 
to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the 
defining characteristics of the fiduciary.101 
 
97 Id. at 16, 18. 
98 Id. at 18. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. (followed in a Singapore case, Ng Eng Ghee v. Mamata Kapildev Dave, 
[2009] 3 S.L.R. 109 [135]). 
101 Bristol, [1998] Ch. 1 at 16. 
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In the context of financial services, the payment and receipt 
of wholly secret commissions to a fiduciary is a clear breach of 
the principle of loyalty.  Equity deploys a very full armory of 
remedies against both the recipient of a bribe or secret 
commission and the payor of the bribe. 
In the context of financial services, it has recently been a 
regulatory requirement to disclose the receipt of commission, as 
discussed above.  In any event, equity has always maintained a 
stringent prohibition of the practice of secret commissions.  The 
motive of the fiduciary is irrelevant.  It is conclusively presumed 
that he has acted corruptly.  The only defense is if it can be 
shown that the payment was made with the full, informed 
consent of the principal. 
C. Remedies for Receipt of Secret Commissions 
The following remedies are available to the principal in cases 
concerning the receipt of a bribe or secret commission.  First, any 
contract of employment between principal and agent may be 
terminated.102  Second, both the fiduciary and the third party 
paying the bribe or secret commission are jointly liable for 
damages in fraud, in the same measure as in the tort of deceit.103  
The damages will be at least the amount of the secret 
commission, but if the principal can prove additional loss—for 
example, paying too much or receiving too little under the 
resulting contract with the payor of the secret commission—that 
too can be recovered.  Third, the principal may rescind any 
contract which resulted between himself and this third party.104  
Fourth, the principal can claim the amount of the bribe or secret 
commission as money had and received from the fiduciary105 and 
also from the briber.106  Fifth, the legitimate commission paid by 
the principal to the fiduciary will be forfeited.107 
 
102 Bos. Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell, (1888) 39 Ch.D. 339, 357–58 
(Eng.). 
103 Logicrose Ltd. v. Southend United Football Club Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256, 
126364 (Eng.).  
104 Id. at 1260. 
105 Lister & Co v. Stubbs, (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, 6 (Eng.). 
106 Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 543, 564–45 (Eng.). 
107 Imageview Mgmt. Ltd. v. Jack, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 63 [22] (Eng.) (citing 
Ansell, 39 Ch.D. at 353; Andrews v. Ramsay & Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 635, 637–38 (U.K.); 
and Rhodes v. Macalister [1923] 29 Com. Cas. 19, 25 (Eng.). 
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Lastly, at one point, it appeared to be accepted in English 
law that a personal claim in money had and received may be 
reinforced by a proprietary claim on the basis of a constructive 
trust, at least against the fiduciary.108  However, in 2011 the 
Court of Appeal decisively insisted that the claim was purely 
personal and not proprietary.109 
Not all of the above remedies can be accumulated.  The 
principal may recover the amount of the bribe or secret 
commission only once, from either the briber or the fiduciary.  
Furthermore, the principal must elect between a compensatory 
claim for fraud and a restitutionary claim for the amount of the 
bribe.110  In the context of financial services, the availability of 
these various remedies for the payment of bribes and secret 
commissions has always been available in principle, although it 
does not appear to have been tested in the reported cases.  It 
further seems clear that attempts to disclose the existence of a 
commission by referring to it in documentation may not be 
sufficient if this does not achieve the full, informed consent of the 
principal.111 
D. Disgorgement of Commission and Other Secret Benefits 
Financial advisers and insurance intermediaries are usually 
the agents of the customers and are therefore in a fiduciary 
relationship with them.  Given that much business has generally 
been commission-driven, with the agent receiving often 
substantial financial benefits from a third party, it would appear 
to be a trite application of fiduciary law that an agent must 
either disclose the existence of the proposed commission 
arrangement in advance to the customer—his principal—or else 
be liable for a claim for disgorgement of that benefit by the 
customer.  However, it is difficult to find a clear statement of this 
principle in the financial services context. 
 
108 Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid, [1994] 1 A.C. 324, 336 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from N.Z.) (U.K.) (disapproving Lister & Co v. Stubbs, (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, 15 (Eng.)). 
109 Sinclair Invs. (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Fin. Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ) 
347, [72][73] (Eng.) (citing Lister, 45 Ch.D. at 15). But see generally FHR European 
Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 17 [33] (Eng.), especially the 
judgment of Sir Terence Etherton Chancellor. 
110 Mahesan S/O Thambiah v. Malay. Gov’t Officers’ Coop. Hous. Soc’y Ltd., 
[1979] A.C. 374, 38283 (P.C.) (U.K.). 
111 For consideration of regulatory duties in respect of payment of commission, 
see discussion, supra Part II.E. 
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E. Application to Financial Intermediaries 
One example of the stringency of the fiduciary requirement 
is Seymour v. Ockwell.112  An independent financial adviser 
(“IFA”) recommended an offshore fund of a company called 
Imperial Consolidated—a fraudulent investment scheme—which 
was held in an Allied Dunbar Isle of Man offshore life policy 
“wrapper bond” in the Isle of Man.113  The IFA received £2,500 
from Allied Dunbar, which was properly disclosed by the IFA to 
the investors in that case, and the claim in respect of that sum 
was dropped at trial.114  However, in addition, Imperial 
Consolidated paid a “marketing allowance” of £4,850 to the IFA, 
of which the IFA was unaware at the time of the initial 
recommendation—albeit that the IFA became aware of it while 
the investment could have been reversed during the “cooling-off” 
period.115  It was not disclosed until some four months after the 
transaction.  His Honour Judge Havelock-Allen QC rejected a 
submission that the “marketing allowance” of £4,850 was not a 
commission:  “Plainly this was a commission whatever label was 
attached to it.”116  It was further submitted that the payment fell 
outside the mischief covered by the then relevant FIMBRA 
rules,117 which required such payments to be disclosed in writing 
before the client signed any proposal.  It was accepted that the 
adviser could not disclose a payment of which she was unaware 
when the contract was signed.  Nevertheless, His Honour Judge 
Havelock-Allen QC continued: 
But Mr McMeel [counsel for the investors] put the case more 
generally.  In his submission a person (such as Miss Ockwell) 
who is under a fiduciary obligation must account to the person 
to whom the obligation is owed not only for any benefit or gain 
obtained or received in circumstances where a conflict of 
interest might exist but also for any benefit or gain obtained or 
 
112 [2005] EWHC 1137 (Q.B.) (U.K.). For the benefits obtained by the Zurich 
broker consultant of a “free week’s holiday in New Orleans” as a result of the 
investment, see id. [57], and the judge’s comments, see id. [73]. 
113 Id. [20]. 
114 Id. [186]. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. [188]. 
117 Pers. Inv. Auth., PIA Rulebook, ch. 12, Rule F29.9, available at 
http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/PIAA%20%7C%20Chapter%2012%20of%20t
he%20PIA%20Rulebook.pdf (material interests and conflicts of interest); id. Rule 
F29.10 (disclosing commission). 
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received by reason of his fiduciary position.  Even if there was 
no conflict of interest, because Miss Ockwell did not know of, 
and ex hypothesi could not have been influenced by, the 
marketing allowance, the allowance was remuneration obtained 
by reason of her position as the claimants’ financial advisor.  
She is liable to account for it and she can only keep it if it was 
promptly disclosed and Mr and Mrs Seymour have expressly or 
by implication consented to her keeping it.  I think that this 
submission is correct.118 
As a matter of fact the allowance was not promptly disclosed 
and it was not argued that the customer had consented.  If 
necessary, the judge would have held it was earned in 
circumstances in which there was the possibility of a conflict of 
interest, because the adviser learned of it during the cancellation 
period when Mr. and Mrs. Seymour were seeking reassurance 
about the wisdom of the investment.  It should have been 
disclosed before making further recommendations to continue 
with the contract.119  This case is probably the clearest 
illustration of the application of fiduciary law in this context.  
Obviously, it concerned the liability of the fiduciary agent and 
not the paying fund, which was hopelessly insolvent. 
F. What Is a Bribe? 
What makes a secret commission a bribe?  Essentially, a 
corrupt purpose does.  In Anangel Atlas Compania Naviera S.A. 
v. Ishikawagima-Ahrima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.,120 Mr. 
Justice Leggatt said:  “[I]t may be said that a bribe consists in a 
commission or other inducement which, is given by a third party 
to an agent as such, and which is secret from his principal.”121  
According to Lord Justice Romer in Hovenden & Sons v. Millhoff, 
If a gift be made to a confidential agent with the view of 
inducing the agent to act in favour of the donor in relation to 
transactions between the donor and the agent’s principal and 
that gift is secret as between the donor and the agent—that is 
to say, without the knowledge and consent of the principal—
then the gift is a bribe in the view of the law.122 
 
118 Seymour, [2005] EWHC [188]. 
119 Id. [189]. 
120 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 167 (Q.B.) (Eng.). 
121 Id. at 171. 
122 [1900] All E.R. Rep. 848 (Eng.). 
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G. Two Categories of Commission Payments: “Wholly Secret” 
Commissions and Inadequate Disclosure 
A highly significant decision of the Court of Appeal in 2007 
has further developed the rules on commissions paid to agents in 
the related context of regulated consumer credit agreements, and 
in particular, what appears to have a “sub-prime,” non-status 
loan arranged through a credit broker.  In Hurstanger Ltd. v. 
Wilson,123 the Court of Appeal distinguished two new sub-
categories of commissions paid to agents by third parties: first, 
“wholly secret” commissions; and, second, cases of limited but 
inadequate disclosure.124 
The defendants, a co-habiting couple, were in arrears with 
their mortgage and sought a further loan of £8,000 through a 
local credit broker, Mr. Dunk, who was trading as One Way 
Finance.125  The aim was to pay off arrears of £5,500 under the 
mortgage, reimburse the broker his £1,000 fee, with the modest 
balance left to provide surplus funds for the couple.126  The loan 
was ultimately provided by the claimant lender.127  One of a 
number of documents which the couple signed included the 
statement:  “The broker who assisted us in making this loan 
application is acting as our agent and is not tied in any way 
whatsoever to the company [the lender].  In certain 
circumstances this company does pay commission to 
brokers/agents.”128  When the loan was made, in addition to the 
agreed £1,000 fee, the lender also paid the broker a commission 
of £240.129  Evidence was given on behalf of the lender that the 
tertiary or non-status lending market was highly competitive and 
that it had become necessary for small lenders to pay 
commissions to brokers to attract business.130  The recorder found 
that there was nothing unusual about the circumstances 
surrounding the payment of the commission or its amount, three 
percent of the loan.131  He rejected a submission that the loan was 
 
123 Hurstanger Ltd. v. Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 299 (Eng.).  
124 Id. [38]–[39]; see also FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] 
EWHC (Civ) 17 (Eng.). 
125 Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [2]. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. [5]. 
128 Id. [4]. 
129 Id. [5]. 
130 Id. [30]. 
131 Id. [31]. 
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void by reason of payment of a secret commission.132  Both parties 
appealed based on aspects of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 
regime, which are not relevant, and the defendants sought leave 
to appeal in respect of the commission issue. 
Lord Justice Tuckey gave the only reasoned judgment in the 
Court of Appeal.  Lord Justices Waller and Jacob agreed.  
Permission to appeal was granted at the start of the hearing on 
the secret commission issue.  Lord Justice Tuckey observed: 
The defendants retained the broker to act as their agent for a 
substantial fee.  The contract of retainer contained the usual 
implied terms, but the relationship created was obviously a 
fiduciary one.  As a fiduciary the agent was required to act 
loyally for the defendants and not put himself into a position 
where he had a conflict of interest.  Yet he agreed that he would 
be paid a commission by the other party to the transaction 
which his clients had retained him to procure.  By doing so he 
obviously put himself into a position where he had a conflict of 
interest.  The defendants were entitled to expect him to get 
them the best possible deal, but the broker’s interest in 
obtaining a further commission for himself from the lender gave 
him an incentive to look for the lender who would give him the 
biggest commission.133 
The law as laid down by the Court of Appeal can be 
described in a number of propositions.  First, where an agent 
receives commission from a third party without the informed 
consent of his principal, he, the agent, is in breach of fiduciary 
duty.  Second, informed consent means consent with full 
knowledge of all the material circumstances and of the nature 
and extent of the agent’s interest.  Third, the third party, here 
the lender, who pays the commission is an accessory to the 
breach and is liable as such.  Fourth, whether there had been 
sufficient disclosure to secure the principal’s consent is a 
question of fact in each case, bearing in mind that what is 
required is informed consent to the agent acting despite a 
potential conflict of interest.  Fifth,  the burden of proving full 
disclosure lies on the agent, or in appropriate cases, the third 
party.  Sixth, it is generally not sufficient for the agent to state 
that he has an interest or to make a statement which would 
merely put the principal on inquiry.  Seventh, it is no defense to 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id. [33]. 
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prove that had the agent asked for the principal’s consent it 
would have been given.134  Eighth, where the principal was likely 
to be vulnerable and unsophisticated, the duty of disclosure 
extended to disclosure of the actual amount of commission he 
was to receive.135 
Ninth, there are two categories of cases:  (a) Where there had 
been no disclosure at all, receipt of a secret commission, or bribe, 
was a blatant breach of fiduciary duty and amounted to a special 
category of fraud in which it is unnecessary to prove motive, 
inducement, or loss up to the amount of the bribe.  The principal 
has alternative remedies against both briber and agent for 
money had and received in the amount of the bribe or damages 
for fraud in respect of the actual loss sustained.136  In addition, 
the transaction between briber and principal is voidable at the 
election of the principal, provided counter-restitution can be 
made.137  (b) There was also a “half-way house” between full 
disclosure and secrecy: where there is partial or inadequate 
disclosure, which is sufficient to negate secrecy.  The second 
category is where there has been some disclosure, but it is 
inadequate in failing to disclose the amount or to make it clear 
that the principal is being asked to consent.  Nevertheless, in 
such cases there is a breach of fiduciary duty, but the defendants 
“are not entitled to deploy the full armoury of remedies which 
would have been available if this had been a true secret 
commission case.”138 
Tenth, the court has discretion whether or not to grant 
rescission.139  Eleventh, the principal has a claim against the 
third party who procured the breach of fiduciary duty for 
equitable compensation in the amount of the bribe, which 
mirrors the common law right to claim the return of the bribe as 
 
134 The first seven propositions in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the judgment draw 
heavily on BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY ¶¶ 6-05557 (William Bowstead & 
F.M.B. Reynolds eds., 18th ed. 2006). 
135 Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [36] (glossing the more tentative statement in 
BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY, supra note 134, ¶ 6-084). 
136 Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [37] (citing Mahesan S/O Thambiah v. Malay. 
Gov’t Officers’ Coop. Hous. Soc’y Ltd., [1979] A.C. 374, 383 (P.C.) (U.K.)). 
137 Id. (citing Pan. & S. Pac. Tel. Co. v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha & Tel. 
Works Co., (1875) 10 Ch. App. 515, 527, 532–33 (Eng.)). 
138 Id. [44]. 
139 Id. [45] (citing Johnson v. EBS Pensioner Trs. Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 164 
[74] (Eng.)). 
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money had and received.140  Twelfth, where the award of 
equitable compensation was adequate to compensate the 
principal fully, it would usually have been unfair and 
disproportionate to rescind the contract between third party and 
principal, notwithstanding questions of counter-restitution.141 
Lord Justice Tuckey made clear what was required in this 
particular context:  “Borrowers like the defendants coming to the 
non-status lending market are likely to be vulnerable and 
unsophisticated.  A statement of the amount which their broker 
is to receive from the lender is, I think, necessary to bring home 
to such borrowers the potential conflict of interest.”142 
Here, there had been sufficient disclosure, through the 
signed documents, to negate secrecy.  However, it was 
inadequate in failing to disclose the amount or to make it clear 
that the principal was being asked to consent, in circumstances 
where the broker was not in a position to give unbiased advice.  
Accordingly, informed consent had not been given.143  On the 
facts of the instant case, the lender, which had paid the 
commission, was guilty of procuring the agent’s breach of 
fiduciary duty and was ordered to pay equitable compensation in 
the amount of the commission, namely £240 plus interest.144  
However, it was held that it would be unfair and 
disproportionate to order rescission of the resulting loan.145 
Where an independent financial adviser or other agent or 
broker owes fiduciary duties to a customer, Hurstanger Ltd. v. 
Wilson makes it clear that the obligation of full disclosure of 
commissions and other payments may be an extensive one.  It is 
critical that some kind of warning of the potential conflict, which 
the proposed, payment poses for the agent, is spelled out in 
appropriate cases, and that the need for the principal to give 
consent is made clear, and presumably that the principal has a 
choice.  The case leaves room for potential differentiation of 
different classes of customer, with potentially sophisticated 
investors or market counterparties requiring only brief disclosure 
of commission but with a regime of full disclosure for at least 
 
140 Id. [46]. 
141 Id. [48]. 
142 Id. [36]. 
143 Id. [38]. 
144 Id. [49]. 
145 Id. [48]. 
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vulnerable consumers, perhaps extending to all retail clients.  
Hurstanger also makes it clear that product providers and others 
who make the commission payments are equally in the frame, 
and in extreme cases, like of total secrecy, are subject to having 
the resulting transaction rescinded. 
H. Application to Sophisticated Investors 
The situation is likely to be different if the investors are 
either high net worth individuals or sophisticated investors or 
both.  Contrast the vulnerable, needy, sub-prime borrowers in 
Hurstanger.  Such investors may be said to know that IFAs 
receive commission and often large sums of commission for their 
advice and services.  This can be illustrated by a decision handed 
down in early 2012 by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance. 
In Hobbins v. Royal Skandia Life Assurance Ltd.,146 the 
plaintiff investor was a wealthy and successful businessman with 
a string of directorships and various overseas properties.147  The 
first defendant was a life insurer and provider of life policy-based 
investment products.148  The second defendant (“Clearwater”) 
was an independent financial adviser and insurance broker.149  
Mr. Hobbins entered into a number of investments on the advice 
of Clearwater, which disclosed in writing from the outset that it 
would charge him no fees but that it would be remunerated by 
commissions payable by life insurers and product providers, such 
as Skandia.150  Mr. Hobbins signed client agreements 
acknowledging this state of affairs.151  Ultimately, Mr. Hobbins 
was dissatisfied with the performance of his Skandia investment 
following the global financial crisis and brought proceedings 
alleging fraud, conspiracy, and breaches of duty by Clearwater 
for which he alleged Skandia was responsible.152  His claim was 
dismissed.153 
 
 
146 Hobbins v. Royal Skandia Life Assurance Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 977 
(C.F.I) (H.K.). 
147 Id. [8]. 
148 Id. [13]. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. [16]. 
152 Id. [3][6]. 
153 Id. [138]. 
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While the payment by commission was disclosed, the critical 
fact was that the amount of the commission was not.  The 
allegations of fraud and conspiracy were groundless and Mr. 
Hobbins was ordered to pay the defendants’ legal costs on the full 
or “indemnity” basis in accordance with the “English rule” of 
costs-shifting.  Justice Reyes was unequivocal that Clearwater 
was Mr. Hobbins’s agent, and not the agent of Skandia, as the 
agreement between Skandia and Clearwater made clear, and 
there was no allegation of ostensible or apparent authority.154  
The judge rejected an argument that the payment involved an 
illegal and criminal violation of the Hong Kong Prevention of 
Bribery Ordinance.155  Justice Reyes was clear that there was 
“lawful authority” for the payments based on a century of 
English common law authority that commission paid to an 
insurance broker by the insured “does not constitute an illegal 
secret profit unless it is in excess of what is normally paid within 
the insurance market.”156  Interestingly, it was argued that the 
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance had changed the 
common law when enacted in 1971 and that the recent 
developments in the U.K. under the RDR and in Australia under 
the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial 
Advice Measures) Act 2011 were only just catching up with the 
law in Hong Kong.  That submission was emphatically rejected.  
Nothing in the text or background of the legislation supported 
the submission:  “One would not expect the legislature to 
overturn a long line of case law in a highly oblique and casual 
manner.”157 
Justice Reyes distinguished the Canadian Supreme Court 
case of R v. Kelly158 and appeared in any event to prefer the 
reasoning of Justice McLachlin, who did not consider the 
disclosure of the amount of commission, to the reasoning of 
Justice Cory, who had insisted on the full disclosure of the 
nature, amount, and source of commission payments in the 
criminal context.  In that case, a financial planner sold 
residential units and was rewarded by both purchasers and the 
 
154 Id. [58][60]. 
155 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, (2005) Cap. 201, § 17 (H.K.); Hobbins, 1 
H.K.L.R.D. [75]]76].  
156 Hobbins, 1 H.K.L.R.D. [79][80] (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. [86]. 
158 [1992] S.C.R. 170 (Can.). 
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vendor, but there had only been vague references to “costs” in the 
extensive documentation.159  Justice Reyes was able to 
distinguish the case as one where there was no meaningful, 
unequivocal disclosure that any commission was being paid at 
all.  There was passing reference to, but no analysis of, 
Hurstanger Ltd. v. Wilson.  It is noteworthy that Justice Reyes 
commented:  “The practice of insurers paying commission to 
insurance brokers may or may not be unsound.  It ought possibly 
to be strictly regulated or even prohibited altogether.  I express 
no view on the matter.  That is a question of policy best left to the 
legislature, not the Court, to tackle.”160 
CONCLUSION 
Following years of financial product mis-selling on a vast 
scale and huge levels of consumer detriment—and the 
consequential massive cost to banks and financial institutions in 
handling consumer complaints and paying compensation—the 
U.K. financial regulatory system has finally determined that 
commission-driven incentives to intermediaries are at the root of 
the problem.  Over the course of a decade, the U.K. has moved 
from having no regulatory rules on disclosure, to a disclosure 
regime and has now decisively embraced a complete ban on the 
payment and receipt of commission in the retail investment 
context.  It remains to be seen how this new regime, in place from 
the start of 2013, improves the culture and practice of the 
provision of financial advice.  A further concern must be the 
extent to which the intermediation channels and incentives for 
advisers will continue to exist in a purely fee-based remuneration 
world.  Will investors be willing to pay for investment advice?  
Will the U.K. market in retail investment, savings, and life 
insurance hold up?  Will financial advice and products reach the 
people who need it?  The outcomes of the U.K.’s prohibition on 
commission-rewarded advice will be watched with interest in 
other jurisdictions. 
 
 
159 Id. 
160 Hobbins, 1 H.K.L.R.D [89]. 
